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 6  The nature and rationality 
of faith 
 Liz  Jackson 
 1.  Introduction 
 Can faith be rational? On this question, the New Atheists speak in one 
voice: no. Sam Harris (2004, 65) says that “religious faith is simply  unjusti-
fi ed belief in matters of ultimate concern” (emphasis his). Richard Dawk-
ins (2006, 23) agrees: “The whole point of religious faith, its strength and 
chief glory, is that it does not depend on rational justifi cation.” Hitchens, 
Dennett, and others make similar remarks. 1 The consensus among the New 
Atheists seems to be that faith can never be rational. 
 In this chapter, I examine the rationality of faith in light of this com-
plaint. 2 The main New Atheist contention seems to be that faith, especially 
faith in God, is irrational. But what is faith? Why think that it makes most 
theists irrational? These are the questions I explore. In the fi rst part of this 
chapter, I examine what the New Atheists say about faith. I argue that on a 
number of specifi cations of the nature of faith, either faith is not irrational 
or most theistic believers do not have faith. In the second part of the chap-
ter, I suggest my own account of the nature of faith, which can be used to 
further constructive dialogue between atheists and theists. 
 2.  Preliminary remarks 
 Before presenting my main argument, a few preliminaries. First: what kind 
of rationality do the New Atheists have in mind when they claim that faith 
is irrational? Philosophers have distinguished many kinds of rationality, 3 but 
the New Atheist writings suggest to me that they think faith lacks  epistemic
rationality. Epistemic rationality is a kind of rationality associated with 
justifi ed belief and knowledge. A belief that is epistemically rational has 
characteristics like being based on evidence, being reliably formed, being a 
candidate for knowledge, and being the result of a dependable process of 
inquiry. Paradigm examples of beliefs that are  not epistemically rational are 
beliefs that are based on wishful thinking, hasty generalizations, or beliefs 
formed as the result of emotional attachment. 4
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 In this chapter, I focus on epistemic rationality. I will argue that, in many 
cases, faith is not epistemically irrational. Note, however, that even if one’s 
faith failed to rise to the level of being  epistemically rational, it would not 
follow that faith is not rational in any sense. For even if one’s faith is epis-
temically defective, it may nonetheless be  practically rational. Practical 
rationality, unlike epistemic rationality, is associated with an agent’s goals 
and what is at stake for that agent, and is more commonly applied to actions 
than to mental states. In this, acts of faith are evaluated for rationality from 
a practical point of view. It might be rational for me to perform some act 
of faith because I have a lot to gain if it is true and little to lose if it is false. 
This can be rational even if believing the associated proposition is irrational, 
because of, for example, a lack of evidence. 5
 Generally, it can be rational to act as if something is true, even if you 
don’t have much evidence for its being true. For example, suppose you are 
a judge in a court case and the evidence is enough to legally establish that 
a particular suspect did it “beyond reasonable doubt.” Yet suppose you 
have other evidence that they are innocent, but it is personal in nature such 
that it cannot legally be used in a court of law. You might not be justifi ed 
in  believing they are guilty, but for legal reasons, you must  act as if they 
are guilty and issue the “guilty” verdict (Cohen 2000). Consider a second 
example. Suppose you are visiting a frozen lake with your young children 
and they want to go play on the ice. You may rationally believe the ice is 
thick and totally safe but nonetheless refuse to let your children play, act-
ing as if it will break, because of what is at stake: it would be very bad if 
they fell in. 
 In the same way that acting on some proposition might be rational even 
if believing it is not rational, taking an act of faith might be rational even if 
one has little evidence for the proposition they are acting upon. For exam-
ple, one might be rational in practicing a religion, participating in prayer 
and liturgy, and joining a spiritual community, even if faith is  epistemically
irrational. Rational action is a practical matter, and sometimes it can be 
rational to act as if something is true even if our evidence points the other 
way. Denying this is to deny the traditional and orthodox way of thinking 
about rational decision making, but this point is frequently overlooked by 
the New Atheists (see, e.g., Harris 2004, 51–55). The general lesson is that 
even if faith is epistemically irrational, acts by faith may still be practically 
rational. 
 Now, I turn to faith’s epistemic rationality. 
 3.  The rationality of faith 
 The New Atheists maintain that faith is epistemically irrational. I fi rst 
note a point of agreement with the New Atheists: it is important to avoid 
epistemically unjustifi ed attitudes. If faith really is epistemically irrational, 
they are right to point this out. Using reason, following evidence, being 
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open-minded, and having courage to face the truth are all valuable; I agree 
with the New Atheists on this point. I applaud their desire to follow the 
evidence and avoid irrationality. 
 However, when it comes to the epistemic rationality of faith, I depart 
from New Atheist thinking. 6 To see why, I begin by making the New Atheist 
objection to faith as clear as possible. What exactly is their complaint? We 
can outline it as follows: 
 (P1) Everyone (or almost everyone) who has faith is epistemically irrational. 
 (P2) All theistic believers have faith. 
 (C) All (or most) theistic believers are epistemically irrational. 
 In this chapter, I argue that for every defi nition of faith the New Atheists 
provide, either (P1) is false or (P2) is false. This method allows us to con-
sider a large variety of (potentially inconsistent) defi nitions of faith. How-
ever, on every defi nition, the conclusion does not follow. Or so I will argue. 
 3.1.  Faith as an epistemically unjustifi ed attitude 
 The New Atheists consistently associate faith with an epistemically unjusti-
fi ed or irrational attitude. Given this, they may simply be stipulating that 
“faith” is the set of (or a subset of) the epistemically irrational attitudes. 
This would make sense of their frequent comments that directly associate 
faith with irrationality. For example, Harris says that religious faith just 
is unjustifi ed belief (2004, 65), a belief for which there is no rational jus-
tifi cation (2004, 72), and an excuse to keep believing when reasons fail 
(2006, 22). Dawkins says faith lacks objective justifi cation (2006, 23) and 
that “the whole point of religious faith” is that it doesn’t depend on rational 
justifi cation (2006, 306). This suggests the following about faith: 
 (1)  Faith is an epistemically unjustifi ed attitude. 
 Given this defi nition, (P1) is trivially true. If faith just is, by defi nition, an 
irrational attitude, then those with faith will be irrational. 
 An initial worry is that simply stipulating that faith is irrational under-
mines other New Atheist goals. One of their main projects seems to be an 
anti-apologetic one: giving reasons why theistic beliefs are irrational or false. 
For example, Dawkins devotes two chapters of  The God Delusion to giving 
arguments against God’s existence (2006, 75–105, 111–151). Hitchens has 
at least six anti-apologetic chapters in  God Is Not Great (see pages 63–73, 
73–97, 109–139). One can fi nd similar arguments by opening virtually any 
New Atheist book and turning to the table of contents. If faith just is  by 
defi nition an unjustifi ed attitude, why devote so much time and space to 
arguing against faith in God? That faith is irrational seems to be something 
they want to argue for rather than stipulate. 
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 Second, it is unclear that (P2) is true on this understanding of faith. If faith 
just is an irrational attitude, then (P2) amounts to the claim that (most) the-
istic beliefs are irrational. There are several points to be made here. First, the 
apologetic project of justifying theistic beliefs has a rich history, with authors 
like Aquinas, Anselm, and Augustine arguing in favor of theistic belief. And 
Christian philosophy and apologetics have not died out with the Enlighten-
ment; rather, there has been a stream of new and increasingly precise chal-
lenges to nontheistic frameworks. 7 Dawkins doesn’t address the majority of 
these arguments, and thus it is far from clear—from anything Dawkins says—
that all of these arguments fail to supply evidence for theism or that theistic 
beliefs simply lack “objective justifi cation” (as Dawkins claims). Addition-
ally, many philosophers acknowledge that, with respect to the debate about 
God’s existence, there is good evidence on both sides, and both theists and 
atheists can be rational. 8 It is far from clear, then, that the evidence points 
obviously and directly to atheism, rendering all theists irrational. 
 One might point out that not all regular churchgoers are aware of this 
evidence. The average person in the pew likely knows very few of the argu-
ments for and against God’s existence. Thus, the New Atheists might con-
cede that the average case of faith in God is not justifi ed. This objection 
brings me to my second point: recently, many prominent philosophers have 
argued that theistic beliefs can be justifi ed without rigorous argument, simi-
lar to how a child’s belief in the external world can be justifi ed without 
rigorous argument. Alvin Plantinga (2000) argues that Christian belief can 
be rational even if it isn’t based on other beliefs or arguments, and Wil-
liam Alston (1991) argues that experiences of God can justify theistic belief. 
While of course these arguments are not the fi nal word on the matter, to 
my knowledge, the New Atheists have not given them any kind of extended 
treatment. 
 Further, it is possible to know something but not know how one knows. 
Consider a child and his father; presumably, the child knows that  he is my 
father , but if asked how he knows this, the child could not give a satisfac-
tory answer. This does not mean the child does not know or does not have 
good evidence that this man is his father. In the same way, many of the aver-
age people in the pews might know that God exists but not be able to satis-
factorily explain how they know this. This does not mean that their faith is 
irrational or that they lack knowledge or evidence of God’s existence. The 
fact that many people of faith are unaware of theistic arguments doesn’t 
entail that their faith is irrational. 9 Therefore, (P2) has not been established, 
given (1). 
 3.2.  Faith as self-justifying 
 A second suggestion is that faith is an attitude that justifi es itself. Consider 
the following quote from Harris (2004, 64): “Faith entirely self-justifying: 
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perhaps the very fact that one believes in something which has not yet come 
to pass (‘things hoped for’) or for which one has no evidence (‘things not 
seen’) constitutes evidence for its actuality (‘assurance’).” 10 The idea here is 
that there is something circular about faith: it justifi es or rationalizes itself. 
This suggests the following: 
 (2)  Faith epistemically justifi es itself. 
 Self-justifying attitudes are philosophically interesting, but they are not 
automatically epistemically irrational. A couple of examples illustrate this 
point. William James (1897) discusses a mountain climber who stands at a 
snowy mountain pass. Suppose that, in order to survive, this climber must 
jump over a deep crevice, and it isn’t obvious that she can defi nitely make 
the jump. However, she knows that if she becomes more confi dent that she 
will successfully make the jump, then she will develop more energy and zeal, 
which will make it more likely that she will jump farther and successfully 
land on the other side. The presence of her belief “I will make this jump 
successfully” makes the belief more likely to be true. Or consider someone 
about to give a speech: as they become more assured they are a talented pub-
lic speaker, this will give them confi dence and poise, making it likely they 
will give a great speech. Similarly, believing I will survive a serious surgery 
can make it more likely I will survive; believing I will play well at my basket-
ball game will instill self-assurance that makes it more likely I will play well. 
 The fact that these beliefs provide evidence for themselves is admittedly 
peculiar. Yet it is unclear that, just on account of being self-justifying, they 
are epistemically defective. In fact, forming the relevant belief makes the 
belief more likely to be true. Attitudes that justify themselves are just that: 
justifi ed! It is far from obvious that (2) renders (P1) true—in fact, (2) seems 
to be at odds with (P1), which says that faith is not justifi ed. 
 It is also unclear that (P2)—that all theistic believers have faith—is true, 
given (2)’s account of “faith,” especially if we are talking about faith in 
God. I don’t see how someone’s faith that God exists would  justify itself, 
since this wouldn’t make it more likely that God exists. However, as I dis-
cuss in Section 4, (2) might describe certain kinds of faith. 
 3.3.  Faith and inquiry 
 In some places, the New Atheists connect faith to insuffi cient or irrespon-
sible inquiry (i.e., evidence gathering). Dennett (2006, 312) expresses this 
concern: “So here is the only prescription I will make categorically and with-
out reservation: Do more research. There is an alternative . . . just take it 
on faith.” Dennett’s idea seems to be that doing research and gathering evi-
dence are in opposition to faith. Similarly, Hitchens (2007, 137) notes that 
faith “choke[s] free inquiry,” and Harris (2006, 28) says that the biggest 
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thing standing in the way of critical thinking and intellectual honesty is 
faith. These remarks suggest the following: 
 (3)  If someone has faith, then that person does not inquire into their faith 
commitments. 
 Whether (3) explains why faith is irrational, rending (P1) true, hangs on two 
things. First, recall that we are concerned with  epistemic rationality. There is 
disagreement among philosophers as to whether obligations to inquire are 
epistemic. Some philosophers have suggested that whether and how much 
we should gather evidence depends on practical, rather than epistemic, con-
siderations. 11 This can explain why it seems that we should spend time gath-
ering evidence about important matters and should not merely memorize 
the phone book, even though memorizing it would give us lots of knowl-
edge. Useless knowledge just isn’t that signifi cant. Some conclude from this 
that inquiry is a practical, rather than an epistemic, matter. However, this 
is controversial, and so for the sake of argument, let us suppose that there 
are epistemic duties of inquiry and that failure to fulfi ll these can make an 
attitude epistemically irrational. 
 This brings up a second question that bears on whether (P1) is true: if 
we have epistemic duties to inquire, what are they? We surely don’t have to 
inquire into all of our attitudes in order for them to be justifi ed. Some state-
ments, like  1 + 1 = 2 or  torturing babies for fun is wrong , are self-evident, 
so no inquiry is required for us to rationally believe or know them. And 
a statement doesn’t have to be self-evident to fall into this category. If my 
mom casually mentions she had eggs for breakfast, I don’t need to interview 
my dad or check the trash for eggshells in order to be justifi ed in believing 
her. Thus, not inquiring into some matter doesn’t automatically make one’s 
attitudes irrational. 
 Hence, there are reasons to worry that (3) doesn’t render faith irrational. 
But what about (P2)? Do most theists have faith if (3) accurately describes 
what it means to have faith? If we understand “inquiry” as merely evidence 
gathering, then almost all of those who believe in God inquire. They look 
for  some sort of evidence their theistic beliefs are true, even if it is merely, 
say, testimonial evidence. A more plausible version of the complaint would 
be that theists don’t inquire enough into their faith. This suggests an amend-
ment to (3): 
 (3*) If someone has faith, then that person does not suffi ciently inquire into 
their faith commitments. 
 Perhaps the biggest problem with (3*), however, is that it does not specify 
what is required for suffi cient inquiry. It will be diffi cult to set the bar for 
suffi cient inquiry at a place where both (P1) and (P2) come out to be true. 
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The bar cannot be too high, because our duties to inquire only go so far; 
as discussed earlier, there seem to be many propositions we can rationally 
believe, and even know, with little to no inquiry. Even for suffi ciently impor-
tant propositions, it is psychologically and practically unrealistic to require 
lots of inquiry for rationality. Also, a very high bar will probably mean that 
most of our attitudes (not just those about God) are irrational, which is 
counterintuitive. The higher the bar, the less likely it is that (P1) is true. 
 For this reason, one might try to lower the bar and say that we need some 
inquiry—but not too much—for the resulting attitudes to be rational. How-
ever, as the bar is lowered, more of those who believe in God will meet it. 
As mentioned earlier, most theistic believers engage in some sort of evidence 
collection and examination. Therefore, the challenge for the New Atheists is 
to set the bar for inquiry at such a place that it is not implausibly demand-
ing, but is also one that most theistic believers do not meet. This challenge 
has not been met, and I am skeptical that it could be. 
 3.4.  Faith and evidence 
 One of the most common things the New Atheists say about faith is that 
it is not based on evidence. Harris (2004, 65) remarks that faith is “an act 
of knowledge that has a low degree of evidence.” Dawkins (2006, 283) 
suggests that if we have faith in something, we won’t change our mind no 
matter what evidence we get; faith is simply “belief without evidence” (ibid, 
199). Elsewhere (1976: 330), he drives the point home: “But what, after all, 
is faith? It is a state of mind that leads people to believe something . . . in 
the total absence of supporting evidence.” Hitchens (2007, 71) notes that 
the “leap of faith” is an imposture because we are required to perform it, 
in spite of “mounting evidence to the contrary.” These remarks suggest the 
following: 
 (4)  Faith is not based on (adequate) evidence. 
 Given (4), is faith irrational? Faith is irrational if  evidentialism is true. Evi-
dentialism is the view that for an attitude to be rational, it must be based on 
evidence. Evidentialism is debated among philosophers, but it is a plausible 
enough thesis (at least on a suffi ciently broad account of evidence) that I will 
assume it for the sake of argument. 
 But what about (P2)? Do most theistic believers base their faith on evi-
dence? Most at least base their beliefs on testimony or experience. Theists 
rely on the evidence of historical testimony (e.g., authors of their scriptures), 
the testimony of their families, spiritual leaders, or others in their commu-
nities. They also rely on their experiences, whether these be experiences of 
God through nature, in prayer, in liturgy/tradition/ceremony, etc. It seems 
that most theistic faith is based on  some kind of evidence. 
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 A New Atheist would likely respond that this doesn’t rationalize faith 
in God. Why? An initial suggestion is that testimony and experience don’t 
count as evidence at all. However, going this route would render most of 
our everyday beliefs irrational (on refl ection, we believe quite a bit on the 
basis of testimony). This also seems to rule out things the New Atheists 
want to count as evidence—for example, belief in some scientifi c claim on 
the basis of the testimony of a reliable scientist (see Harris 2004, 66). They 
might even want to allow for someone to disbelieve in God because of their 
experiences of evil in the world. Thus, I don’t think they want to rule out 
testimony and experience altogether. 
 Alternatively, they might want to say that testimony and experience 
can justify, but not always. Then they could distinguish between different 
types of testimony to exclude testimony that rationalizes faith but allow 
for other sources of testimony. They might distinguish between reliable and 
misleading testimony and maintain that we only ought to trust the former. 
However, in cases where we have misleading evidence, it is possible to have 
rational false beliefs. When there is a huge upset in sports, before the game, 
almost everyone believes the better team will win. This belief is rational even 
though it turns out to be false, because of the overwhelming (but mislead-
ing) evidence in its favor. It is almost universally accepted that rationality 
and truth can come apart, and it is rational to follow our evidence even 
though it doesn’t always lead us to the truth. Thus, the suggestion that faith 
is irrational because it is based on misleading evidence isn’t promising. 
 Another suggestion is that the problem with trusting religious testimony 
is that its claims are not scientifi cally demonstrable. This route seems to be 
one that is advocated by Harris (2004, 74–77), who suggests that if testi-
mony is to be trusted, its claims must be verifi able. Similarly, Jeremy Stenger 
(2009, 72), author of  The New Atheism , maintains that testimony needs to 
be checked with independent observations. Maybe the problem with faith 
isn’t lack of evidence, but being based on the wrong kind of evidence. This 
leads to a slightly different focus: the problem with faith is that faith is not 
based on empirical evidence. 
 3.5.  Faith and empirical evidence 
 Empirical evidence is evidence we get by experiencing or studying the world 
around us. A paradigm example of empirical evidence is scientifi c evidence. 
In many places, the New Atheists suggest that the problem with theistic 
faith is that it isn’t adequately based on empirical evidence. Dennett (2006, 
238–239) states, “Religious avowals concern matters that are beyond obser-
vation, beyond meaningful test” and 
 it has been noted by many commentators that typical, canonical religious 
beliefs cannot be tested for truth . . . this is . . . a defi ning characteristic 
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of religious creeds. They have to be “taken on faith” and are not subject 
to [scientifi c or historical] confi rmation. 
 Hitchens (2007, 5) says that his principles are not faith because he distrusts 
anything that contradicts science. Harris (2006, 16) associates faith with 
“untestable propositions” and also maintains that we can trust engineers 
and doctors, but not priests or rabbis, because the former make defeasible, 
falsifi able claims about the world, whereas nothing can demonstrate the 
falsity of the core beliefs of spiritual leaders (2006, 66). 
 On the face of it, one might think that these remarks suggest that empiri-
cal evidence is the only source that epistemically justifi es. This suggests that 
the problem with faith is as follows: 
 (5)  Faith is not based solely on empirical evidence. 
 For (5) to render (P1) true, something like the following principle must hold: 
for an attitude to be rational, it must be based  only on empirical evidence. 
However, this principle is implausible. This fi rst problem with it is that, if it is 
true, it cannot be rationally believed, since it cannot be justifi ed by empirical 
evidence alone. This is because principles about rationality are not ones we 
learn by studying the empirical world; they involve ought-claims that science 
cannot establish. Thus, there are self-referential problems with the principle. 
Second, the principle also assumes that empirical evidence is the only kind of 
evidence that can make an attitude rational. This assumption is doubtful, as 
it overlooks sources of evidence such as  a priori evidence (the source of evi-
dence for math, logic, moral truths, etc.), evidence from memory, and many 
other kinds of non-empirical evidence (see Kelly 2014). If empirical evidence 
were the only kind of evidence we could rationally rely on, a large majority 
of our beliefs would be irrational. So, given (5), it is unclear that (P1) is true. 
 Generally, the principle from the previous paragraph closely resembles 
what some call  scientism , the view that empirical science is our only source 
of evidence and/or the only justifi cation for belief (see Taylor 2016). This is 
a view that is often attributed to the New Atheists, but it is unclear that all 
of them hold this view, and some have even explicitly denied strong versions 
of scientism (see Stenger 2009, 285). However, given the central empha-
sis they put on scientifi c knowledge and scientifi c practice, they likely still 
endorse something like what  Taylor (2016 ) calls “weak scientism,” or that 
empirical science is our  best method for forming beliefs about the world. 
 If weak scientism is true, this suggests the problem with faith is not that 
it isn’t based only on empirical evidence, but that it isn’t based on empirical 
evidence  at all . This seems like a more charitable interpretation of the New 
Atheist complaint: 
 (5*) Faith is not based on any empirical evidence. 
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 For (P1) to be true, given (5*), this requires a weaker principle than before: 
for an attitude to be rational, it must be based  at least partially on empiri-
cal evidence. This principle allows for more of our everyday beliefs to be 
rational. 
 Whether (5*) renders (P1) and (P2) true depends on what exactly one 
counts as “empirical evidence.” However, we can show that (5*) won’t do 
the job without a precise answer. Consider beliefs about the past; beliefs 
about math, logic, morality; belief in  induction , that the future will be like 
the past (an assumption indispensable to scientifi c practice); or even the 
belief that empirical evidence is sometimes reliable (e.g., that I am not a 
brain in a tank with electrodes stimulating my senses). Are these beliefs 
based partially on empirical evidence? If not, as long as these beliefs are 
sometimes rational, then the principle underlying (5*)—that rational belief 
requires being partially based on empirical evidence—will be false. Thus, 
(P1) will also be false. Suppose instead that these beliefs are partially based 
on empirical evidence. Then, why can’t faith that God exists also be par-
tially based on empirical evidence? Of course, none of these matters—truths 
about math, logic, morality, induction—are ones that science can fully settle 
(although science may bear on them). But the main point is that it is unclear 
why faith that God exists fails to be based on empirical evidence, whereas 
other philosophical beliefs are based on empirical evidence. 
 The basic problem, then, is that there is parity between faith in God and 
these other philosophical beliefs when it comes to empirical evidence. It is 
unclear that (5*) can render beliefs about the past, logic, morality, math, 
induction, and anti-skepticism potentially rational but not theistic faith. If 
we admit these former beliefs are often based on empirical evidence and 
therefore potentially rational, then there is no reason to think that faith or 
belief that God exists cannot also be potentially rational. 
 A third potential principle worth considering is the following: 
 (5**) Faith is not testable/falsifi able. 
 This principle is slightly different than (5*), because something could be 
falsifi able but not be based on empirical evidence. Take a random scientifi c 
hypothesis I just thought of, and suppose I don’t use any empirical evidence 
in generating the hypothesis. Suppose I decide to believe the hypothesis. 
My belief is not based on empirical evidence, but my belief is testable or 
falsifi able. 
 This route is still problematic. First, we can run a dilemma similar to the 
one we ran in response to (5*). Are my philosophical beliefs and beliefs 
about the past testable? If so (maybe “testable” means that we can get 
scientifi c evidence that bears on it), then there is no reason to think that 
whether God exists is similarly testable. If philosophical beliefs and beliefs 
about the past are not testable, then for (5**) to render (P1) true, it seems 
like we are going to have to give up on the rationality of these beliefs, too. 
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This is surely not a route the New Atheists would want to go—induction 
and our beliefs about the external world are indispensable for scientifi c 
methods, and for the New Atheists, scientifi c beliefs are paradigm instances 
of rational beliefs. 
 Consider, fi nally, that certain sacred creeds might even be more like 
scientifi c hypotheses than wholly non-empirical philosophical proposi-
tions. For example, Christianity teaches that Jesus was an actual histori-
cal fi gure who rose from the dead. Paul himself says that if Jesus was not 
raised, Christian faith is in vain (1 Cor. 15:14). If historians or scientists 
discovered the bones of Jesus, this would call the truth of Christianity 
into question, potentially falsifying the whole system. 12 Other religions 
make similar historical claims—a central Islamic claim that Muhammad 
received the Koran via revelation from Allah. Thus, some religious claims 
are falsifi able. 
 *** 
 In conclusion, it is not clear what faith is, such that it is both epistemically 
irrational and something all or most theistic believers have. We have yet to 
see any good reason to think that most theists are irrational, although now 
we might have a good idea of what faith is  not . Now, I turn to the question 
of what faith  is . 
 4.  The nature of faith 
 In this section, I outline two characteristics of faith. First, recall the moun-
tain climber whose belief that she will make the jump is self-justifying; hav-
ing the belief makes it more likely that she will be successful. We discussed 
other similar examples: an athlete, a public speaker, and someone about to 
have surgery. In these cases, the belief made itself more likely to be true. My 
fi rst proposal is that these self-fulfi lling attitudes describe a certain type of 
faith in ourselves and others. 
 In many of these examples, those with self-fulfi lling attitudes can be natu-
rally described as having faith in themselves. The athlete has faith that she 
will play well; the public speaker has faith that he will give the talk capably. 
Here, faith in oneself creates evidence for itself. Similarly, when I believe 
that someone else will do something aptly and I communicate this to them, 
my confi dence in their abilities can make it more likely that they will do 
well. For example, consider two people who are about to marry but real-
ize that statistically, divorce is likely. They nonetheless have faith that their 
marriage will last, and this faith makes it more likely that their marriage 
will last. This enables them to sincerely commit to marriage based on their 
faith in themselves and each other, because the fact that they have this faith 
makes their commitment more likely to stick. 13
 Not only do I think that this is a natural way to think about faith in one-
self and faith of communities, but I think this explains why the relationship 
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between faith and evidence might seem, on the face of it, odd or puzzling. 
Many of our beliefs don’t create evidence for themselves in this way, and 
without an explanation for how this works, it is not surprising that, at fi rst 
glance, people might think faith of this sort is irrational. However, once the 
model is understood, it becomes clear that this kind of faith is not epistemi-
cally defective—it justifi es itself. 14
 Nevertheless, I do not think that self-fulfi lling faith describes faith in 
God. Someone’s faith that God is loving, for example, doesn’t make God 
more loving. 15 However, consider second characteristic of faith, which can 
describe faith in God: faith is not solely based on empirical evidence. The 
idea here is that when we have faith, we go beyond what can be defi nitively 
proved by science. If someone’s belief in something is based solely on empir-
ical evidence—for example, they saw an experiment done right in front of 
their eyes—then they don’t have faith in that thing. Why would they need 
faith? It was verifi ed right in front of them. 
 However, in many of our decisions about what to believe and what to 
do, we do not (and cannot) have indubitable empirical proof. When I have 
faith that my friend is trustworthy and trust her with my secret, I am “going 
beyond” the empirical evidence (even if I have  some empirical evidence that 
she is trustworthy). This understanding of faith explains why faith is an 
important part of fl ourishing communities—empirical evidence won’t give 
us all we need, especially in personal relationships. 
 Advocates of this view needn’t insist that when we have faith, we fail to 
proportion our beliefs to the evidence—instead, we rely on non-empirical 
sources of evidence. Testimony is one important example. Testimony is an 
indispensable source of evidence, and philosophers have argued that testi-
monial evidence and faith are closely connected. 16 When we acknowledge 
evidence goes beyond the empirical, we can see why faith doesn’t ignore or 
oppose evidence; rather, scientifi c evidence alone is not suffi cient for a fl our-
ishing life and meaningful relationships. 
 If faith is not fully based on empirical evidence, this also explains why 
faith is often contrasted with tangible proof and why I don’t need to have 
faith in things like a well-established scientifi c hypothesis or that there is a 
cup on the table in front of me. This account also explains why we “live by 
faith, not by sight” (2 Cor. 5:7) and why faith is “evidence of things unseen” 
(Heb 11:1). 
 On this account, faith in God requires more than empirical evidence. 
Although empirical/scientifi c evidence can bear on the question of whether 
God exists, I doubt that it will settle the matter. Debates about theism 
require us to look beyond the empirical, just as the question of whether the 
external world exists or whether any empirical evidence is reliable. The faith 
of most theists, therefore, goes beyond the empirical—whether that means 
utilizing  a priori arguments for God’s existence, relying on the testimony of 
those in your spiritual community, historical fi gures or spiritual leaders, or 
trusting experiences of God’s voice in their lives. 
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 5.  Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued for two things. First, I have argued that there 
is no single notion of faith that is both irrational and had by most theists. 
The New Atheists have not provided a successful argument that most theists 
have a faith that is irrational. Second, I have suggested two characteristics of 
faith. First, Jamesian self-justifying beliefs describe a unique kind of faith in 
oneself and others. Second, faith is not solely based on empirical evidence. 
One of the important lessons we learn from this is that looking beyond the 
empirical evidence is an essential part of the fl ourishing life. Although I can-
not fully defend this here, this suggests that faith is not only rational, but an 
essential part of human fl ourishing. 17
 Notes 
 1  See Hitchens 2007, 137; Dennett 2008; Harris 2006, 22. 
 2  For another response to the New Atheists on faith, see Kvanvig 2013 . 
 3  See Cohen 2010, 663; Plantinga 1993b, 132–137. 
 4  In this chapter, I use “rational” and “justifi ed” interchangeably. 
 5  Robert Audi (2011: Part II) distinguishes between  propositional faith , or faith that 
some proposition is true, and  volitional faith , which is much more action-like. 
Even if a lack of evidence makes propositional faith irrational, one may nonethe-
less be rational in having volitional faith and performing particular acts of faith. 
 6  For the purposes of this chapter, I will not assume faith that  p entails belief that 
p (for more on this debate, see Alston 1996; Howard-Snyder 2013 , McKaughan 
2016, 2017 ). Nonetheless, I don’t think much hangs on this; most of the New 
Atheists use “faith” and “belief” interchangeably. 
 7  See, e.g., Plantinga 1993a, 216ff; Beilby 2002 ; Rea 2002; Walls and Dougherty 2018 . 
 8  Some have even suggested that theism is a permissive case, where our evidence 
permits more than one rational doxastic attitude toward a proposition. See Sch-
oenfi eld 2014; Kopec and Titelbaum 2016 . 
 9  Thanks to Josh Rasmussen. 
 10  See also Hitchens 2007, 202. 
 11  See Conee and Feldman 1985 ; Feldman 2000; Berker (2018). 
 12  Harris 2004, 68 even acknowledges this. 
 13  Thanks to Jonathan Nebel. 
 14  Of course, I do not want to claim that this kind of faith is always rational or that 
we cannot ever be overly confi dent in our abilities. 
 15  It has been suggested to me that on some readings of James, Jamesian faith does 
not  create evidence for itself; rather, it  reveals evidence for itself. With this read-
ing, faith enables us to access evidence that was there all along but is otherwise 
unavailable to us. For example, there might be evidence for God’s existence that 
is not accessible unless one fi rst “meets the hypothesis halfway” and puts their 
faith in God. However, the evidence exists whether or not one embraces the 
hypothesis. In this, Jamesian faith might be applicable to faith in God. Thanks 
to Ian Huyett. 
 16  See Locke 1689: book IV, chapter 18, paragraph 2; Alston 1996. 
 17  Thanks to Josh Rasmussen, Kevin Vallier, and Ian Huyett for helpful comments 
on earlier versions of this chapter. Thanks to Andy Rogers, Jonathan Nebel, 
Andrew Moon, Rebekah Jackson, and those who attended the New Theists con-
ference for invaluable feedback on the content of this chapter. 
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